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Theorizing Path Dependence: A Review of Positive Feedback 
Mechanisms in Prominent Cases 
 
The concept of path dependence has often been criticized as vague and only narrowly 
applicable. Although we can find some very refined definitions of the concept, we also find a 
wide range of empirical phenomena being described as path-dependent. We argue that more 
detailed accounts of the positive feedback mechanisms that form paths can take path 
dependence beyond this state of being overdetermined, but under-specified. Reviewing three 
well-described cases of path-dependent dynamics in technology markets, regional clustering, 
and organizations, we define a core set of positive feedback mechanisms that constitute path 
dependence at different analysis levels and clarify the relationship between positive feedback 
and increasing returns. We show that path-dependent processes, that is, processes driven by 
positive feedback that veer toward rigidity or lock-in, can be (but do not have to be) found 
under many labels, including structural inertia, coevolution, or institutional persistence. We 
conclude that a precise definition of path dependence does not need to be at odds with the 




The concept of path dependence has become increasingly employed in the social sciences and 
in economics (e.g. Lamberg and Tikkanen, 2006; Schneiberg, 2007; Antonelli, 2008; Gruber 
2010), being used in fields as diverse as historical or comparative institutionalism (e.g. 
Mahoney, 2001; Hall, 2003; Thelen, 2003), regional economics (e.g. Martin and Sunley, 
2006; Sydow et al., 2010), technological innovation (e.g. Dosi, 1982; Dolata, 2009), or 
strategic management (Schreyögg and Kliesch-Eberl, 2007; Koch, 2008; 2011) to show how 
‘history matters’ in producing institutional, regional, technological, or organizational patterns 
over the longer term (e.g. Puffert, 2002; Vanloqueren and Bareta, 2009). As a theoretical 
framework, path dependence provides an explanation for potentially problematic long-term 
outcomes that deliberately de-centralizes agency by referring to a system-logic of self-
reinforcing processes triggered by contingent events (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989).  
Path dependence has recently been criticized as lacking conceptual clarity and being 
applied to mean different things in too wide a range of cases (Page, 2006; Vergne and 
Durand, 2010; Martin, 2010). Some scholars have therefore sought to offer more formal 
definitions of specific characteristics of path dependence to differentiate it from related 
concepts, such as ‘imprinting’, ‘structural inertia’ or ‘escalating commitment’ (Sydow et al., 
2009; Vergne and Durand, 2010). While contributing to conceptual clarity, this strategy of 
demarcation has decreased the concept’s empirical applicability, and is thus at odds with its 
widespread use in describing processes (e.g. Manning and Sydow, 2011; Thrane et al., 2010; 
Reinstaller and Hölzl, 2009). Our aim in this article is to allow for both tight definitions and 
wide use by integrating the concept into wider research on organizational and industrial 
evolution. Defining path dependence as a process triggered by a contingent events, then 
moved along through positive feedback mechanisms until it results in rigidity or lock-in, we 
want to focus and specify what Pierson (2004: 21) notes as “the crucial feature of a historical 
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process that generates path dependence” – that is ‘positive feedback’ (or ‘self-
reinforcement’). 
Specifically, we argue that positive feedback or self-reinforcement can both be 
specified as a necessary condition for path dependence, and can act as an integrating factor – 
as a conceptual’ bridge’ to other theories that explain evolutionary processes characterized by 
increasing stability which can lead to ‘lock-in’. We start from a generic definition of positive 
feedback as an increase in the likelihood of an action happening at t1 if the same action has 
been conducted by the same (or other) actors at t01. We hold that path dependence, rather than 
being a marginal concept that can only be identified under highly controlled methodologies 
(Vergne and Durand, 2010: 737), can serve to explain many different “processes of a 
diminishing scope of action that unintentionally develop their own pull and are driven by 
positive feedback” (Sydow et al., 2009: 698). Accepting positive feedback as a core 
explanans, cases previously described under such labels as “regional lock-in” (Grabher, 
1993), “increasing returns” (Aharonson et al., 2007), or “nonlinear strategic dynamics” 
(Burgelman and Grove, 2007) can be classified as being cases of path dependence. In 
theoretical terms, what matters is that the path dependence construct pays attention to which 
dynamics lead to which kinds of outcomes, whereas other constructs focus more on early 
events (e.g. imprinting) or final outcomes (e.g. structural inertia).  
In this article we work towards a more systematic treatment of positive feedback as a 
causal mechanism in path-dependent dynamics (Davis and Marquis, 2005; Pajunen, 2008). 
After briefly summarizing the recent debate about path dependence, we review the positive 
feedback mechanisms that have been theoretically discussed and empirically elaborated in 
three important fields: technology markets; regional clustering of firms and institutions; and 
organizational and strategic processes. We find a list of ‘typical’ positive feedback 
mechanisms that work on and between the local and the system/population analysis levels 
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and can be corroborated and distinguished from other factors, particularly increasing returns, 
which are at best temporary characteristics of positive feedback mechanisms that define their 
speed of operation. We demonstrate that if the object to be explained – a rigidified action 
pattern – is clearly defined and the causal mechanisms – network effects or increasingly 
shared cognitions – are carefully spelled out at the different relevant analysis levels, path 
dependence can indeed be widely applied as an explanatory concept. This discussion is 
relevant not just to path dependence researchers, but to anyone interested in understanding 
organizational and industrial development processes.  
 
2 Reviewing Path Dependence and Positive Feedback Mechanisms 
The notion of path dependence in social and economic processes has gained increasing 
attention in several fields of research. About 10 percent of all articles published between 
2003 and 2007 in the major management studies journals reference the concept directly, 
compared to about 6 percent between 1998 and 2002 (Vergne and Durand, 2010), while 
Walker (2000: 126) refers to path dependence as “one of the most exciting ideas in 
contemporary economic geography” (quoted in Martin, 2010: 2). The concept originates 
from the technology development and diffusion field, where David (1985) and Arthur (1989; 
1990) modeled non-ergodic, historically-determined processes as an alternative to the 
widespread economic assumptions of equilibrium and efficiency. This thinking has also been 
applied to understanding institutional development in both economics (North, 1990; David, 
1994) and in political science (e.g. Collier and Collier, 1991; Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 2000).  
Despite these definitions, the label ‘path dependence’ has often been assigned to cases 
based merely on anecdotal empirical evidence. Furthermore, critical voices have raised 
conceptual questions as to the effects of actor involvement (e.g. Garud and Kumaraswamy, 
2010; Stack and Gartland, 2003), of whether change is possible (e.g. Crouch and Farrell, 
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2004; Boas, 2007), or the inefficiency of paths (Vergne and Durand, 2010). As a response to 
some of these issues, Vergne and Durand (2010) have proposed attending more closely to 
specific properties such as the influence of initial conditions, types of triggering events and of 
sustaining mechanisms, or the levels of analysis that can be used to distinguish path 
dependence from other ‘history matters’-based explanations such as imprinting or structural 
inertia, which they argue should be controlled for in experimental research or simulations. 
While a more ‘scientific’ treatment of path dependence is indeed valuable, the recent 
attempts to differentiate path dependence from other theoretical arguments may not 
necessarily support this goal. While, for instance, Vergne and Durand (2010) argue that path 
dependence is triggered by “contingent events”, they assert that structural inertia is triggered 
by “firm founding”; that path dependence is sustained by “self-reinforcement”; and that 
institutional persistence is due to the “stickiness of institutions”. But how can we know, for 
instance, that institutional stickiness has not been caused by self-reinforcing processes, or that 
firm founding was not a contingent event in explaining the structural dynamics that result in 
organizational hyperstability? Sydow et al. (2009) pursue a similar demarcation strategy that 
does not result in mutually exclusive categories.  
Instead, we propose to focus on positive feedback mechanisms as the core theoretical 
construct for path dependence research, independent of preferred methodologies or 
disciplinary contexts. While it has recently been argued that both positive and negative 
feedback mechanisms together constitute a path-dependent process (Page, 2006; Vergne and 
Durand, 2011), most researchers agree that demonstrating path dependence requires the 
carefully spelling out of its self-reinforcing dynamics driven by positive feedback (Pierson, 
2004; Bennett and Elman, 2006; Sydow et al., 2009; Beyer, 2010; Vergne and Durand, 2010). 
In order to address the research question of ‘What positive feedback mechanisms drive path-
dependent processes at different analysis levels and in different social settings?’ our paper 
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compares and contrasts positive feedback mechanisms in different contexts and on different 
analysis levels, so as to theorize the construct in a way that is both conceptually precise and 
more useful for further empirical research.  
Positive feedback in technology markets. Many cases of technological 
standardization such as the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985), the DVD (Dranove and 
Gandal, 2003), or mobile telecommunication standards (Koski and Kretschmer, 2005) have 
been attributed to positive feedback processes and characterized by increasing returns to 
adoption that occur for a variety reasons. First, many technology products have high set-up 
costs but low manufacturing costs, which fall rapidly as sales increase, and these dynamic 
economies of scale enable first movers to reinvest their returns in product innovation, making 
further growth more likely. Second, network effects mean products often become more 
attractive the more widely they are adopted: direct network effects are at work (for example) 
where the utility of using a telephone increases with the number of other network subscribers, 
whereas indirect network effects describe the situation where the variety and quality of 
complementary goods, as ancillaries to the main product, increases with its greater adoption, 
thus increasing the attractiveness of the underlying technology for both current and potential 
users (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Third, there are customer learning effects: users of a 
particular technology who have become familiar and thus “grooved in” to the product 
(Arthur, 1996: 103) are more likely to purchase subsequent versions. Fourth, agents’ returns 
may be affected not only by other agents’ past choices, but also by their future decisions: in 
an increasing returns market, agents’ expectations about others’ future choices may affect the 
adoption of one or other technology (Arthur, 1989). 
Positive Feedback in regional clusters. Path dependence is often evoked in 
explaining regional clustering, which typically involves institutional as well as inter-
organizational processes and thus lies at a meso-level of analysis between technology markets 
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and organizations. Positive feedback has been used to explain different phenomena – such as 
the success and specialization of regional clusters (e.g. Aharonson et al., 2007), the inability 
of a region to adapt to changes (Grabher, 1993), or learning processes in a clustered region 
(Bathelt and Boggs, 2003) – sometimes explicitly under the label of path dependence and 
sometimes without employing the concept. Different mechanisms are discussed according to 
whether the focus is to explain a positive dynamic towards clustering or the actual (or 
potential) resultant rigidity. These include, individual level coordination effects and 
complementarity effects at the institutional level, which are similar to direct and indirect 
network effects discussed above. In addition, learning effects connect the individual and 
institutional levels via mental models: learning is susceptible to path dependence in how new 
information is ‘selected out’ or filtered into existing mental maps. At the collective level, 
organizations learn indirectly by observing the successful behavior of others, and may be 
encouraged by uncertainty or normative pressures to imitate them.  
Positive feedback in organizations. In the still-young field of research into path 
dependence in organizations, Sydow et al. (2009) discuss four “self-reinforcing” 
mechanisms: coordination effects, complementarity effects, learning effects, and adaptive 
expectations which resemble those discussed above, but in the context of organizational rules, 
resources, practices and strategies. They can be triggered by rational, utility-driven behavior - 
but can also result from emotional reactions, cognitive biases and political processes. 
However management research describes similar processes without referring to path 
dependence: Miller (1992), for instance, presents the Icarus paradox, in which successful 
strategies become reinforced (both cognitively and structurally) until organizations get 
‘stuck’ and then decline, arguing that such “architectures of simplicity” (Miller, 1993) are, in 
part, caused by successful top managers decreasing the breadth of their information searches. 
Similarly, in his many studies on Intel (to which we refer in more detail later) Burgelman 
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(e.g. 2002: 326) outlines the co-evolutionary lock-in between Intel and the PC market 
brought about by “a positive feedback process that increasingly ties the previous success of a 
company’s strategy to its existing product-market environment, thereby making it difficult to 
change strategic direction.” In inter-organizational terms, Porac et al. (e.g. 1989; 1995) show 
how self-reinforcing interpretive activity led to the emergence of shared mental models 
among Scottish knitwear organizations. These examples are typical variants of path-
dependent processes in which early actions or decisions are reinforced through success and 
eventually firms become locked-in onto a chosen path, a situation which is detrimental when 
environmental conditions change. 
 
3 Method: Reviewing Prominent Cases  
We have revisited three illustrative cases of positive feedback dynamics, rereading them with 
a critical eye on how different authors have identified positive feedback mechanisms in 
different contexts and at different levels of analysis: 
• Microsoft’s dominance in desktop software markets, to illustrate positive 
feedback in technology markets; 
• Silicon Valley, to illustrate positive feedback in regional clustering based on 
institutional and (inter-)organizational developments; 
• Intel, as a case of positive feedback in organizing and strategizing. 
Our aim is to review the rich and oft-described empirical data for the following reasons. First, 
we are able to gain a comparative cross-case perspective on the path dependence construct, 
which is typically applied to only one case at a time due to the time-consuming nature of 
holistic analyses (Dorado, 2005). Second, relying on many different studies of one case 
allows us to at least partially compensate for any biases in individual studies.  
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3.1 Case and Material Selection 
Our selection of “most likely cases” (Ruddin, 2006: 809) follows a theoretical sampling logic 
(Yin, 1994; Flyvbjerg, 2006) – if we cannot identify positive feedback mechanisms at 
different analysis levels leading to stability in these cases, which have attracted so much 
scholarly attention in this context, it would probably be even harder elsewhere. Microsoft is 
not only “everyone’s favorite example” (Shapiro and Varian, 1999: 24) for phenomena such 
as lock-in and increasing returns in a technology market, but also transcends mere 
technological compatibility arguments with mechanisms that have been described at both the 
local and population levels. While the literature on Microsoft often refers explicitly to 
positive feedback, it does not generally use path dependence as a theoretical framework. The 
literature on Silicon Valley as a regional clustering case integrates technological and 
organizational positive feedback dynamics with discussion of the path-dependent institutional 
dynamics common in political science and economic geography, so path dependence is often 
referred to explicitly. The Intel case illustrates the organizational mechanisms that lead to 
strategic lock-in: but while positive feedback is mentioned in the literature, structural inertia 
and co-evolution have been the concepts predominantly applied in this case. 
We selected literature on the basis of a combination of theoretical and empirical 
keywords. We searched in a selection of literature data bases for “path dependence/y”, “lock-
in”, “increasing returns/positive feedback”, “self-reinforcement” and “mechanism” as 
theoretical key words in all three cases, looking for each in combination with two to three 
different case-specific keywords. Having identified key authors for each case, we then drew 
on their references for further sources, leading us to papers not explicitly referring to our 
theoretical keywords. In collecting material and filtering mechanisms from the literature we 
relied on the ‘saturation’ principle as defined and used in qualitative research (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990; Arts, 2003): some may find this approach eclectic (even untenable), but it has 
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been widely used by sociology and political science scholars (e.g. Layder, 1998; Arts, 2003).  
3.2 Analytical Procedure 
We review the empirical arguments made in the literature with respect to explaining the 
stable patterns exhibited by each case and the underlying mechanisms in operation to 
reconstruct our own descriptions and analyses. First, we constructed a chronological history 
of the most important events in each case and distilled information on the path- or pattern-
constituting mechanisms proposed in the literature. Second, we listed the mechanisms 
mentioned in each study, mostly keeping to the original wording, discarding articles that 
referenced our search terms but which lacked any original empirical analysis. Third, we 
compared and clustered the mechanisms thus identified into more abstract mechanism 
categories, and harmonized their labeling in the light of the theoretical discussion presented 
above, using slightly adapted versions of those suggested by Sydow et al. (2009): (1) 
coordination effects, covering utility resulting from others following the same path; (2) 
complementarity effects, stemming from two or more otherwise independent social processes; 
(3) expectation effects, similar to self-fulfilling prophecies; and (4) investment and learning 
effects due to the accumulation of specialized but non-transferable stocks of investment or 
knowledge. As a fourth and last step, we evaluated the mechanisms we found in the literature 
on each case in terms of two operational levels - the local and the population.  
 
4 Positive Feedback Mechanisms in Different Contexts 
4.1 PC Operating Systems: One Path-dependent Market, Multiple Mechanisms 
The Path. The dominance of Microsoft Windows and Office in the personal computer (PC) 
software market is so visible and strong that these programs have been called “de-facto 
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standards” (Takahashi and Namiki, 2003). High switching costs mean both the market as a 
whole and organizational and individual adopters are affected by path dependence in the 
sense of having (very) limited room for maneuver despite the existence of alternatives that 
are at least functionally equivalent. PC operating systems have became one of the outstanding 
empirical examples of path dependence in technology markets where positive feedback 
mechanisms lead ex-ante unpredictability to develop towards an ex-post state of stable 
equilibrium (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Varian et al., 2004). Given its great economic 
importance, Microsoft’s antitrust trial in the United States has generated enormous scholarly 
attention (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1998; Klein, 2001; Liebowitz and Margolis, 2001; Reddy et 
al., 2001; Werden, 2001). 
Contingency. When IBM introduced its first PC in 1981 (using Microsoft DOS as its 
operating system) it entered an existing but rather small market. CP/M was the leading 
operating system at the time, but quickly lost market share and eventually ‘died’ around 
1985, despite being technically compatible with IBM’s PC. In their analysis, Gandal et al. 
(1999: 92-93) argue that it was not obvious whether DOS was technically superior to CP/M: 
far more important in terms of its adoption was the availability of complementary software 
and the relationship between IBM and the business community that followed IBM’s lead (see 
also Langlois and Robertson, 1992). In 1984, when Apple Computer bundled its technically 
superior Mac Operating System (MacOS) together with its computer hardware, it was unable 
to replace the IBM PC/MS DOS combination as the industry standard; explanations range 
from incorrect strategies (Apple licensed neither its operating system nor its computer 
hardware) to the existing network effects of the large already-installed base of Microsoft and 
IBM-compatible PCs. When the introduction of Windows 95 and Windows NT4 coincided 
with the failure of IBM’s OS/2 in the mid 1990s, alternative operating systems became 
increasingly marginalized (Koski and Kretschmer, 2004: 8), so that, notwithsatnding major 
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technical improvements in such open source operating systems as GNU/Linux, Windows has 
remained unchallenged as the de-facto standard over many OS generations since it became 
dominant in 1995.  
Mechanisms. The greatest barrier to the adoption of both historical (MacOS, OS/2) 
and contemporary (MacOS, Linux) alternatives to Windows, was and is not quality, but the 
lack of complementary products (especially at the application level) and switching costs 
(Varian et al. 2004: 37; 21; see also Koski and Kretschmer, 2004). Even such path 
dependence skeptics as Liebowitz and Margolis (2001: 191) acknowledge the positive 
reciprocal association between the operating systems and application software. The long pre-
announced introduction of Windows 95 also illustrates the importance of expectations in 
network markets: as Shapiro and Varian note: “In a very real sense, the product that is 
expected to become the standard will become the standard. Self-fulfilling expectations are 
one manifestation of positive-feedback economics and bandwagon effects” (1999: 13-14; 
emphasis in the original). The small (but persistent) minority of individuals who have made 
the effort to switch to Linux or MacOS contrasts with the monoculture of Windows desktop 
PCs found in nearly all large organizations (MERIT 2006).2 At least some of the mechanisms 
(such as indirect network effects or learning) appear to interact heavily with organizational 
environments. Table 1 lists the literature on which our case illustration is based and the 
respective mechanisms we identified. 
 
Source Mechanisms (wording as in the article) 
Akemann (1999) - economies of scale 
- complementary products 
- direct network effects 
- indirect network effects 
- product specific investments 
Besen/Farrell 
(1994) 
- self-fulfilling expectations 
- installed base advantage (building an early lead) 
- supply of complementary goods 




- high front-end R&D costs and marginal manufacturing and distribution costs (economics of 
increasing returns) 
- strategic new platform pricing (“tipping”) 
- network effects 
- bundling of complementary products 
Economides 
(2001) 
- network effects/externalities by availability of complementary components (“applications barrier 
to entry”) 




- production economies of scale 
- network effects  
- applications barrier to entry 
- (forced) bundling of complementary products due to market power 
Katz/Shapiro 
(1998) 
- network effects as demand-side economies of scale, including complementary products (“virtual 
networks”) 
- practices like “tying, predation, or exclusive dealing” as a consequence of positive feedback  
- self-fulfilling expectations as a form of positive feedback 




- network effects through indirect channels (“in conjunction with complementary products”) 
- end-users and IT personnel create an individual and firm-wide expertise for a particular operating 
system 
- direct network effects (“data exchange”) 
Liebowitz/ 
Margolis (2001) 
- network effects 
- complementarity between operating system and applications 
Lopatka/ Page 
(1995) 
- entry barriers from large installed base (direct network externalities) 
- entry barriers from availability of application software (indirect network externalities) 
- “the two sorts of entry barriers ‘magnify and reinforce each other’” (p. 326) (complementarity 
effects) 
- expectations of buyers and suppliers 
- investment in human capital (sunk costs) 
- anticompetitive licensing restrictions “to solidify monopoly position”  
Schilling (1999) - learning curve effects 
- network externality effects (also due to complementary goods) 
- signaling effects (likelihood of adoption) 
Takahashi/ 
Namiki (2003) 
- direct and indirect network effects 
- use of Windows OS standard as a basis for anticompetitive practices  
Windrum (2001; 
2004) 
- installed base effects 
- complementarity between vertically related products  
Table 1: Mechanisms found in the literature on PC operating systems 
 
Despite differences in wording, most scholars seem to agree on the sets of mechanisms that 
operate at the local and population levels (Table 2). Local level investment and learning 
effects are reciprocally linked to population level mechanisms: individual and organizational 
actors take non-transferable investments in licenses (‘sunk costs’) or learning into account 
when making (re-)adoption decisions, which produces macro-level complementarity in the 
form of a growing pool of specialized software, service providers and personnel (see also 
Bednar et al. 2011; Vergne and Durand 2011). Expectation effects serve to drive coordination 
and complementarity effects, as adopters follow the path they expect the herd will take, thus 
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enhancing network or installed base effects (Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Koski, 1999). These 
mechanisms differ in their modes of operation: while coordination and complementarity 
effects are often attributed to ‘increasing returns’, i.e. a phase of escalating self-reinforcement 
as soon as one alternative is widely expected to become the market standard, this cannot be 
claimed for the other mechanisms. Nevertheless, to the extent that learning is tied to 
specialized application software or training facilities, this acquisition of non-transferable 






- direct network effects/externalities (Akemann, 1999; Campbell-Kelly, 
2001; 2003; Economides, 2001; Gilbert/Katz, 2001; Katz/Shapiro, 1998; 
Kretschmer, 2004; Liebowitz/Margolis, 2001; Takahashi/Namiki, 2003; 
Schilling, 1999) 
- installed base advantage (Besen/Farrell, 1994; Lopatka/Page, 1995; 
Windrum, 2001; 2004); 
Coordination effects Population 
- complementary products (Akeman, 1999; Besen/Farrell, 1994; Campbell-
Kelly, 2001; Katz/Shapiro, 1998; Schilling, 1999) 
- application barrier to entry (Economides, 2001; Gilbert/Katz, 2001; 
Liebowitz/Margolis, 2001) 
- indirect network effects/externalities (Akeman, 1999; Kretschmer,2004; 
Lopatka/Page, 1995; Takahashi/Namiki, 2003) 
- complementarity between vertically related products (Windrum, 2001; 
2004) 




- self-fulfilling expectations (Besen/Farrell, 1994; Katz/Shapiro, 1998; 
Lopatka/Page, 1995) 
- signalling effects (Schilling, 1999) 
Expectation effects Population 
- economies of scale due to product specific investments (Akemann, 1999; 
Campbell-Kelly, 2001;2003; Gilbert/Katz, 2001) 





Table 2: Categorization of mechanisms in PC Operating Systems 
4.2 Silicon Valley: A Case of Path-Dependent Regional Clustering, Path Creation, or 
Both? 
The Path. The ‘Silicon Valley’ area around San Francisco Bay, birthplace of some of the 
world’s largest electronics firms, has been used already by Arthur (1994) to illustrate path-
dependent regional clustering processes. While in post-war times a number of other regions 
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(such as Route 128 with MIT and Harvard in Boston) have had even greater concentrations of 
engineers, research facilities and successful firms, Silicon Valley won the race to become the 
leading semiconductor technology center (Kenney and von Burg, 1999; 2000; 2001). In 1976, 
thirty-one of thirty-six U.S. semiconductor firms were located there, and in 1988, the Valley 
had attracted 40% of all US venture capital (Cohen and Fields, 1999). Kenney and von Burg 
(2001: 128) have recognized Silicon Valley as an ideal case for examining the strengths and 
weaknesses of path-dependent explanations because of the interplay of self-reinforcing 
dynamics and intentional agency in this setting.  
Contingency. Before World War II, the region around Stanford University combined 
high-tech firms, entrepreneurship and university involvement (Sturgeon, 2000) and formed an 
“already prepared environment” for what was to develop during and after the war (Kenney, 
2000; Kenney and von Burg, 2001). The opening of Shockley Transistor - the first major 
semiconductor enterprise - in Palo Alto in 1955 has been said to have set the critical cluster 
dynamic in motion. Unable to find capital for starting his own business on the East Coast, 
William Shockley was convinced to return to the Bay area by the ‘father of Silicon Valley’, 
Frederick Terman, then professor, Dean of engineering and Provost at Stanford University 
(Leslie and Kargon, 1996). Fortunately (in hindsight) Shockley turned out to be a poor 
manager, and a line of spin-offs from Shockley Transistor led to the foundation of such firms 
as Fairchild Semiconductor, Intel, National Semiconductors, and AMD (Cohen and Fields, 
1999; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). 
Mechanisms. Since Marshall’s (1920) work on industrial districts, clustering 
processes, both within and beyond the Silicon Valley “master cluster” (Cooke, 2002), have 
been attributed to direct and indirect network effects also called “agglomeration economies” 
(e.g. Perroux, 1950; Arthur, 1990; Krugman 1991; Arthur, 1994; Zhang, 2003). Increasing 
returns result because co-location creates a pool of highly qualified labor and specialized 
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suppliers; improves access to capital and services; ensures proximity to customers; and 
enables the exchange of knowledge, information and contracts within social networks 
(Aharonson et al., 2007). While these effects clearly involve positive feedback dynamics at 
the population (in this case, cluster) level, other arguments stress the importance of key actors 
(see Table 3). 
Source Mechanisms (wording as in the article) 
Aharonson et al. 
(2007) 
- positive feedback loops or virtuous cycles as concentration of firms creates beneficial scale and 
- information externalities by attracting additional labor and other inputs and facilitating the 
exchange of ideas 
- more ideas are generated for local diffusion as spatial concentration of firms within a - 
technological specialization increases 
Arthur (1990; 
1994) 
- unbounded increasing returns to agglomeration: net benefits of firms being close to other firms 
increases with the number of firms 
- more firms in one location imply better infrastructure, deeper labor markets, better legal and 
financial services, higher availability of spare parts and thus reduced inventory costs, social 
networks emerge for the exchange of knowledge 
- other benefits due to geographical differences, such as differences in transportation costs, raw 
materials, factor prices, climate, proximity to markets 
Bresnahan et al. 
(2001) 
- agglomeration economies 
- direct external effects: learning from neighboring firms or customer-supplier relationships 
- indirect external effects: supply of key inputs such as capital, labor 
- social increasing returns to human capital 
- ‘new economy’ positive feedback complementary to ‘old economy’ institutions 
Hakanson (2005) - concentration of specialized and complementary epistemic communities 
- easy access to interesting opportunities by individual jobseekers and entrepreneurs and 
resulting high rate of firm formation 
- social and psychological barriers make firms and individual entrepreneurs stick to their 
original location 
- diseconomies of agglomeration: rising prices, congestion, local competition 
Kenney and von 
Burg (1999; 
2001) 
- Economy 1: technological discontinuities and new economic opportunities create the seeds for 
spin-off entrepreneurship 
- Economy 2: institutional infrastructure (venture capitalists, professional services) aims at the 
creation of new firms 
- self-reinforcing, virtuous cycles between Economy 1 and 2: reinvestments of capital enable 
and are enabled by the success of startups  
- Moore’s Law and Metcalfe’s Law: technological paradigm of semiconductors provide 
recurring opportunities for entrepreneurs 
- imitation of success of early founders in peer network 




- vertically integrated self-sufficient firms  
- interdependence and close ties as a source of innovation 
Table 3: Mechanisms found in the literature on Silicon Valley 
 
Kenney and von Burg (1999; 2001) attribute the growth of Silicon Valley to the cluster’s 
continuous ability to create new firms, based on recursive relationships between ‘Economy 1’ 
institutions – established firms, universities, and corporate research laboratories – and 
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‘Economy 2’ actors – entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, lawyers, consultants, etc.. A 
booming Economy 1 creates the seeds for spin-off entrepreneurship, which are then exploited 
by Economy 2, in turn making the local environment even more conducive to new firm 
creation. Adding to these arguments on inter-organizational effects, Hakanson (2005) 
suggests that agglomeration is based on the development of local, specialized epistemic 
communities rather than on abstract spillover effects, but stresses that its powerful negative 
side-effects (such as increased congestion or high rents) need to be offset by benefits for 
individual entrepreneurs.  
Saxenian (e.g. 1990; 1994; 1999) sees no evidence of cluster level path dependence, 
and focuses instead on the flexible, decentralized, non-inert organizational structures that 
have enabled Silicon Valley’s entrepreneurs to create new business opportunities. If anything, 
she locates path dependence in the autarkic management models of the large established 
semiconductor firms, against which entrepreneurs revolted in a wave of semiconductor 
startups in the 1980s (Saxenian, 1990). Others also stress the importance of individual and 
organizational mechanisms that do not necessarily involve positive feedback, rather than 
cluster-level agglomeration effects that do. The Silicon Valley case offers a good illustration 
that positive feedback dynamics do not contradict notions of intentional agency, and also 
points to the interaction of different positive (and negative) feedback dynamics at different 
levels of analysis (Table 4). Interestingly, negative externalities – in the form of 
diseconomies of agglomeration – occur in the Silicon Valley cluster, they do not counter its 
development because of complementary positive feedback dynamics on other analysis levels.  
Mechanisms Category Level 
- direct network effects/externalities:  the value of locating in a 
given area increases with the number of other similar firms in the 
area due to knowledge spillovers and the proximity of customers 
and suppliers (Aharonson et al., 2007; Arthur, 1990; 1994; 





- indirect network effects/externalities: the supply of key inputs 
increases with the number of firms in the same location 
(Aharonson et al., 2007; Arthur, 1990, 1994; Bresnahan et al., 
2001) 
- complementarity between Economy 1 and 2 (Kenney and von 
Burg, 1999; 2001) 
- complementarity between existing institutions and new firms 
(Bresnahan et al., 2001) 




- expected value of co-locating based on direct and indirect 
network effects (Arthur, 1990; 1994; Bresnahan et al., 2001) 
- imitation of successful peers causes high firm formation rates 
(Hakanson, 2005) 
Expectation effects Population 
- successful investment causes further success and investment 
(Kenney and von Burg, 1999, 2001)  
- non-transferable social ties and knowledge leads to location 




Table 4: Categorization of mechanisms in Silicon Valley case 
4.3 Intel Corporation: A Locked In Company? 
The Path. Although most empirical work dealing with the Intel case has been undertaken by 
one scholar, Robert Burgelman (1991, 1994, 1996, 2002, and together with Andrew Grove, 
1996, 2007), the longitudinal data he provides is very rich. He identifies Intel as an example 
of “co-evolutionary lock-in” and describes trajectories of emergent corporate strategies 
without actually referring to path dependence, but to a “strategically dominant logic” 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986) and “structural inertia” (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). In more 
recent work, Burgelman (2003) distinguishes the changing strategic foci of three epochs in 
Intel’s development: period I (1968-1985), with a strong focus on memory chips; period II 
(1985-1998), with a focus on microprocessor chips; and period III (since 1998), focused on 
the building block of the internet. The first strategic lock-in occurred towards the end of 
period I, when top management remained focused on memory chips as the company’s core 
business, even though its share of revenues had already declined in comparison with that 
earned by microprocessors. The second strategic lock-in (late period II) was due to the strong 
link between the company’s growth and that of the PC market, which had been pushed by the 
new CEO Andrew Grove, who had succeeded Gordon Moore after Intel’s strategic re-
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positioning in 1987. Intel’s revenues grew from $1.9 billion to $25.1 billion between 1987 
and 1998, and its net income from $248 million to $6.9 billion. Grove centralized Intel’s 
organization structure and reduced autonomous strategic action in a top-down process he 
called “vectoring” (Burgelman, 2002: 326). Bottom-up processes – like that which led to the 
original success of the microprocessor in the early 1980s – only rarely succeeded in this new 
organizational environment, except for Intel’s engagement in the chipset business in the mid-
1990s (Burgelman, 2002: 332-335).  
Contingency. In the first period, a resource allocation rule that systematically 
assigned scarce production capacities to product activities that maximized manufacturing 
margins prevented Intel from failing as an organization in spite of its strategic misalignment 
(Burgelman, 1991: 245). The change in top management meant that external market pressure 
for strategic re-positioning finally translated into organizational change. In the second period, 
Intel deliberately controlled its core product market, and while this led to success in its 
dominant business area, Intel’s narrow and top-down strategic focus was a barrier to new 
ventures in other business areas. As in the transition between the first two periods, external 
changes – the declining growth of the PC market – again indicated the need for strategic re-
positioning.  
Mechanisms. The mechanisms described by Burgelman present Intel as a case of 
lock-in at the organizational strategy level. Although situations differed, many of the 
underlying inertial mechanisms (cf. Table 5) were similar in both transition periods.  
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Source Mechanisms (wording as in the article) 
Burgelman (1991) - holding to the ‘self-evident truths’ that are no longer true 
- survival motivates conservatism 
Burgelman (1994) - sunk investments in R&D as basis for the company’s learning curve 
- emotional attachment to previously successful product lines 
- bounded rationality in high-velocity environments 
Burgelman (1996) - complementarity between organizational functions and technical competencies 
- competencies leading to initial competitive advantages become a source of failure later on  
Burgelman and 
Grove (1996) 
- ‘inertial aftermath of success’: relying on previously successful competencies 
Burgelman (2002) - investments in certain R&D fields are justified by previous investments in the same fields 
- co-evolutionary lock-in with development of markets of complementary products (PCs) 
- escalation of commitment in investment decisions 
- complementarity of independent ‘strategic thrusts’ 
- following corporate strategy facilitates career advancement of people who will then 
continue following the same strategy 
Burgelman (2003) - co-evolutionary lock-in of corporate strategy with company’s structural context 
- complementarity between induced strategy and personnel development 
Burgelman and 
Grove (2007) 
- inertial induced strategy making due to strategic actions based on existing distinctive 
competencies 
- corporate strategy induces strategic actions by executives deeper in the organization that 
are aligned with it 
Gawer and 
Henderson (2007) 
- complementarity between corporate strategy and market development 
Table 5: Mechanisms found in the literature on Intel 
 
The locus of positive feedback lies either in individuals’ (cognitive) spheres or at the 
organizational level: in either case, inertial effect results from the difficulty of transferring 
accumulated investment over to other contexts. Emotional attachment to a strategy 
(Burgelman, 1994: 41-43), for example, grows over the years and is, by definition, non-
transferable to another strategy, as it results from the strategy’s idiosyncratic characteristics. 
Individual and organizational learning leads to inertia only insofar as it is specialized on a 
certain domain and has accumulated over time, just as, even though they turn into sunk costs 
if they become non-transferable, a spiral of investments constitutes a positive feedback 
mechanism.  
Burgelman (1991: 250) further identifies complementarity between the organization’s 
regular career advancement structure and the alignment of initiatives with official strategies 
allows managers to take advantage of organizational learning. In the second case of strategic 
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lock-in recursive and self-reinforcing feedback loops between Intel’s strategic (investment) 
decisions and the market environment resulted in a co-evolutionary lock-in (Burgelman, 
2002: 349). 
Not all mechanisms easily fit into our pre-defined categories that as depicted in Table 
6. “Bounded rationality in high-velocity environments” (Burgelman, 1994), for example, 
does not necessarily seem to be a case of positive feedback, which is why we only reluctantly 
include it in the category of ‘expectation effects’. As in the Silicon Valley case, (strategic) 
agency – which some might call ‘path creation’ – played an important role at Intel. Strategic 
agency in early, contingent phases triggered positive feedback mechanisms which were 
originally welcomed, but which then kept in place an inefficient strategy that became harder 
and harder to change. Subsequently, different positive feedback mechanisms meant that 
actors - both at the top management and at other organizational levels -were mainly restricted 
to following the chosen path: ‘path breaking’ was only made possible via personnel changes 
or the “autonomous strategic action” of a few individuals.  
 
Mechanisms Category Level 
- complementarity between strategy and market development (Burgelman, 





- complementarity between organizational functions and technical 
competencies (Burgelman, 1996) 
- complementarity of independent “strategic thrusts” (Burgelman, 2002)  
- corporate strategy induces strategic actions by executives aligned with it 




- holding on to ‘self-evident truths’ (Burgelman, 1991; 1996) 
- emotional attachment to strategy (Burgelman, 1994) 
- ‘inertial aftermath of success’ (Burgelman and Grove, 1996) 
- escalating commitment in investment decisions (Burgelman, 1994; 2002) 





- bounded rationality in ‘high velocity environments’ (Burgelman, 1994) 
- complementarity between strategy and personnel development (Burgelman, 
2002; 2003) 
Expectation effects Local 




7.1 A Core Set of Positive Feedback Mechanisms 
Our case review provides empirical examples for all of the pre-defined mechanism categories 
in different social contexts and on different levels of analysis. This allowed us both to extend 
the scope of applicability of the mechanisms outlined by Sydow et al. (2009) and to specify 
their levels of operation, and also to see how they often interacted in forming an 
organization’s historical path. In this, we echo suggestions by Page (2006) and Vergne and 
Durand (2011) that a path can be the result from of the interactions of perhaps many different 
mechanisms.  
While coordination, expectation, and complementarity effects always involve the 
interaction of different actors and the resultant diffusion of technologies, institutions or 
routines at the organizational level, learning and investment effects usually work at local 
levels. In our cases, irreversible local-level investments interacted with the resulting network 
effects at the population level to rigidify path-dependent action patterns. In the case of 
Microsoft’s dominance in the software market, organizational adopters who accumulated 
capabilities specific to complementary software applications made spirals of investments in 
learning and so strengthened complementarity effects at the market level. In the Silicon 
Valley case, we can see that both coordination and complementarity effects at the cluster 
level were based on individual-level emotional/social and financial investments and 
expectations. At Intel, continuously increasing investments into a distinct technological 
design interacted with associated organizational incentive structures to form a rigid 
complementary system. We have therefore been keen to abstain from all-too inclusive 
concepts like ‘demand-side economies of scale’ that blur the distinctions between different 
mechanisms which can be analytically valuable.  
Furthermore, Arrow’s (2000) argument that path dependence is mainly characterized 
by quasi-irreversibility is only part of the story – rather we suggest that path dependence is 
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essentially determined by a combination of local irreversibilities and nonlinearities at both 
levels (cf. Bassanini and Dosi, 2001: 57), possibly further reinforced by negative feedback 
(Page 2006). Population level lock-ins - such as a dominant technological designs (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986) – thus always go hand in hand with positive local level feedback, for 
example, in form of spirals of irreversible investments and expectation effects.  
Distinguishing mechanisms at different levels also allows us to make the distinction 
between the roles of individual actors and macro-level structural effects at different phases of 
path-dependent processes (Sydow et al., 2009). In the positive feedback phase, individual 
actors are no longer able to strategically influence population level outcomes, or are trapped 
in local level action patterns, at least for a time. At the same time, path-dependent dynamics 
are embedded in other vertical and horizontal processes that form the background conditions 
against which positive feedback mechanisms work. These conditions can result from, 
interfere with or impact upon these mechanisms, and can also be strategically influenced by 
actions that amplify or dampen their effect (cf. Arthur 1994: 127-128; Garud and Karnoe, 
2003; Stack and Gartland, 2003; Garud et al., 2010). In the Intel case, for instance, the change 
of CEO disrupted the positive feedback dynamic. 
7.2 The Role of Increasing Returns 
Implicit in the distinction between our mechanisms’ different operational levels is a more 
nuanced explanation of (at least temporary) increasing returns at population or market levels 
(for a formal differentiation see Page, 2006), which rest, to a significant extent, on sub-
market-level mechanisms that may, in fact, accumulate constant or decreasing returns. 
Greener (2005) already criticizes Pierson (2000) for incorrectly assuming that path 
dependence is the ‘study of increasing returns’, as the persistent dominance of increasing 
returns would take away any opportunity for change, and suggests path-dependent systems 
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might go through a period of increasing returns in their creation phase, but then enter a period 
of constant returns in the reproduction phase (see also Mahoney, 2000; Thelen, 2003) – 
which also fits with Sydow et al.’s (2009) phase models of path-dependent processes. 
Although increasing returns were not explicitly measured in any of our cases – a 
common issue in empirical studies of path dependence – we contend that none of the cases 
exhibits a mechanism that constantly produced increasing returns. In the software market, 
increasing returns (and their anticipation) seem to play a role in establishing market 
dominance at the macro level and redistributing power at the micro level, but the mechanisms 
reproducing this dominance - such as organizational learning spirals - do not necessarily have 
increasing returns structures. Moreover, it is difficult to identify the nature of a returns 
structure when looking at the reinforcement and stabilization of organizational structures, 
strategies and institutions: both the Silicon Valley and Intel cases exhibited the accumulation 
of certain variables over time with fluctuating intensity, but it is hard to tell whether this 
happens with increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale. 
The fact that some authors equate path dependence with “increasing returns 
economics” (e.g. Campbell-Kelly, 2001) may in part be attributed to their imprecise use of 
terms and concepts. As Arthur (1994: 112) points out: “Self-reinforcement goes under 
different labels in (...) different parts of economics: increasing returns; cumulative causation; 
deviation-amplifying mutual causal processes; virtuous and vicious circles; threshold effects; 
and nonconvexity.” But self-reinforcement is not the same as increasing returns: self-
reinforcement mechanisms may be accompanied by increasing returns, but also with constant 
or even decreasing returns – although this latter should not be confused with negative 
feedback. Even with decreasing returns, the variable under question is still increasing –
returns are just lower than in increasing or constant return phases. Ironically, this can be 
demonstrated in technology diffusion - the very field in which Arthur developed his theory of 
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path dependence: a standard technology diffusion S-curve is the result of ongoing positive 
feedback, but displays all three return structure possibilities at different points in time. 
Accordingly, Metcalfe (1994) considers increasing returns as one (important) case of positive 
feedback in path-dependent selection processes, but uses the specific returns structure mainly 
to explain differences in the speed of selection processes (cf. Vergne and Durand, 2011). We 
therefore consider increasing returns as a factor that may result from or impact on positive 
feedback mechanisms, but not as a necessary condition (Page, 2006): while positive feedback 
is a feature of all the mechanisms that potentially lead to path dependence, the existence of 
increasing returns is not. 
7.3 The Relationship between Path Dependence and ‘Competing’ Concepts 
By focusing on the explanandum of path dependence - i.e. a stable pattern or shared social 
standard - and on positive feedback mechanisms as the explanans, we have shown not only 
how cases of path dependence can be presented more convincingly by drawing on a set of 
mechanisms that can typically be found on different analysis levels, but also that path 
dependence my underlie sets of evolutionary processes even when the concept is not 
explicitly used. There are, of course, many theoretical lenses researchers can use to analyze 
empirical data: the width of the field of research on organizational and industrial evolution 
means that path dependence is only one concept among many and, researchers may prefer to 
use others, depending on their discipline and analytical focus.  
But this does not mean path dependence can only be developed as an explanation if an 
empirical case cannot be explained otherwise, e.g. by way of structural inertia or 
institutionalization (Vergne and Durand, 2010). While agreeing that not all 
institutionalization or organizational structuring processes are necessarily path-dependent, we 
argue that this concept may help to explain certain kinds of processes which have been given 
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those labels. We thus follow Vergne and Durand’s view (2010: 752) that, to make a plausible 
case of path dependence, it is necessary to specify for each path what self-reinforcement 
components are at play and over how long. We disagree, however, with their assertion that 
this can only be done under controlled conditions and requires a clear demarcation of path 
dependence from any other theoretical ‘history matters’ arguments.  
Nor does developing a path dependence argument on the basis of positive feedback 
mechanisms necessarily imply determinism or even fatalism (cf. the critique by Garud and 
Kumaraswamy, 2010). Sydow et al. (2009) work on the premise that actors are 
knowledgeable agents, aware of their actions and the rules they follow, but that they still face 
the possibilities of “unacknowledged conditions” and “unintended consequences of action” 
(Giddens 1984: 294). Path dependence explains processes in which – consciously or 
unconsciously – such actors contribute to mechanisms exhibiting positive feedback and, in 
doing so, reduce the scope of variety for further agency (Koch, 2008). We hope our review of 
positive feedback mechanisms at different levels and in different social settings increases the 
applicability of path dependence as an explanatory concept for researchers’ use. 
 
8 Conclusions 
We contribute to the recent debate on the use and value of the path dependence concept by 
focusing on positive feedback mechanisms as the concept’s explanatory core. Specifically, 
we show how distinguishing different phases and levels of path-dependent processes might 
help to put the often misleading concept of increasing returns to new use –as a temporary 
phenomenon resulting from positive feedback at different levels. However, as we have 
reviewed only prominent or ‘most likely’ cases, all of which have related to high-technology, 
the accumulation of the different mechanisms we observed might be an artifact of our case 
selection and not characteristic of path dependence in general. Our guess is, however, that 
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path dependence is rarely driven by just a single mechanism: there will usually be interaction 
– and mutual reinforcement – between local and population level mechanisms. But it is not 
only individual level behaviors that lead to unintended population level effects – local level 
mechanisms may themselves follow positive feedback patterns leading to firm lock-in, as the 
Intel case shows. 
Reviewing three well-known cases of positive feedback dynamics in different fields, 
we find that even a precise definition of path dependence may be widely applicable. In 
contrast to recent attempts to differentiate path dependence from other concepts (e.g., 
structural inertia or co-evolutionary lock-in) we suggest seeking to integrate at least some of 
these approaches by using positive feedback as both an explanatory variable and as a 
conceptual bridge. The positive feedback concept can be used in controlled experiments or 
simulations, as Vergne and Durand (2010) suggest, as well as in historical case studies 
(Bennet and Elman, 2006). Again, we suggest researchers should use the concept where it is 
appropriate, rather than allowing it to become a corset that is both methodologically and 
conceptually too constricting, although we agree that simulating positive feedback 
mechanisms and boundary conditions at different analysis levels and in different settings 
would be a promising avenue for further path dependence research. 
Following up on this point, our study does not allow us to test and measure 
empirically such variables as the duration of increasing returns, the leeway of strategic 
agency under positive feedback, or boundary conditions. Such research would extend the 
scope of our case review to provide an even more nuanced picture of positive feedback 
mechanisms and path dependence.  
We have focused in this article on the interaction between different positive feedback 
dynamics on different levels: exploring negative feedback mechanisms as complementary 
factors remains a task for further research. In addition to formal and simulation-based 
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approaches (Page, 2006; Vergne and Durand 2010), qualitative case analyses would provide 
important insights on whether and how positive and negative feedback dynamics interact; a 
similar case-revisiting method such as the we have applied might also be helpful in this 
regard. 
Our focus on mechanisms has also meant that we have largely neglected the question 
of how paths are triggered and what actually constitutes lock-in, and only allowed us to 
address briefly the issues of contingency and the associated idiosyncratic aspects of 
individual path-dependent processes. Further research should investigate different types of 
lock-in more closely to be able to derive a more precise conceptual definition and to study the 
relationship between mechanisms and triggers and lock-ins. Finally, relying only on 
secondary data, we were unable to examine the micro-dynamics of the operations of causal 
mechanisms in detail, as outlined in the works of, for example, Mayntz (2004), Craver and 
Bechtel (2007) or Pajunen (2008). But, again, we hope that the core set of mechanism 
categories expatiated in this article may lay the ground for their analysis in more depth in 
future research.  
We conclude that the concept of path dependence is more than “a concept in search of 
a case” (Kay, 2005, p. 569), but rather that its explanatory power, when based on a self-
reinforcing dynamic, can help integrate different theoretical concepts dealing with stability in 
organizational and industrial evolution processes. 
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1 This definition is compatible with works that do not differentiate between positive feedback and self-
reinforcement (e.g. Pierson 2004; Sydow et al. 2009) and with Page’s (2006: 88) distinction between the terms, 
which holds that self-reinforcement can be considered a special case of positive feedback. Crediting the 
usefulness of Page’s distinction between the two concepts, in the remainder of this paper we will refer only to 
“positive feedback” as the more general term, without actively making a distinction between the two concepts in 
our analysis.  
2 Only recently have some exceptional examples, such as the municipality of Munich (Dobusch, 2008), switched 
their desktop software to open source software alternatives.  
